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Abstract

The roles and responsibilities of the various members included in the courtroom workgroup were
evaluated in determining the prevalence of ordinary injustices. The dynamics among such
members were found to be the basis under which lax adversarialism, and ultimately injustice
within the criminal justice system, dominates. Prosecutorial discretion and inadequate public
defense systems were observed to compromise justice on several occasions.
Keywords: courtroom, workgroup, criminal justice system, injustice, judge
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Courtroom Workgroup Interactions and Injustices
In America, the criminal justice system is categorized as an adversarial system. Within
the criminal justice system are the organizations known as the courts, in which the courtroom
work is performed as a group activity (Bach, 2009). As courtroom work is performed
collectively, the existence of the courtroom workgroup emerges. The norms of the collective
workgroup govern the daily operations of courts, ultimately trumping the adversarial nature
under which the system was designed. While each individual has specialized functions to carry

out, incentives and shared goals motivate the way in which the individual members perform their
job duties. Such incentives and shared goals serve as motivation to maintain a cooperative
courtroom workgroup. In doing so, however, members of the courtroom workgroup may lose
sight of the court’s ultimate goal, the goal of justice. “Workgroup members develop
relationships that are cemented by exchanges of inducements as well as by the shared goals”
(Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977. p. 10). As workgroup members further operate in a shared task
environment, they are provided with resources and are imposed by common constraints
regarding their actions (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977).
Judges, prosecuting attorneys and defense attorneys make up the main players of
courtroom workgroups, however, courtroom clerks, jurors, witnesses, police officers and bailiffs
can also be considered to be members of the group. The way in which these players interact has
a direct effect on the outcome of criminal cases, as their ongoing relationships determine
acceptable job performance. Whereas collegiality and collaboration are often considered
predictors of success for many communal ventures, such supposed keys to success are instead
the cause of failure within the criminal justice system. “When professional alliances trump
adversarialism, ordinary injustice predominates” (Bach, 2009, p. 6). Ordinary injustice prevails
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under the condition of lax adversarialism, which allows for the slipping of both cases and
defendants through the criminal justice system unchecked. (Bach, 2009). Studying the
courtroom workgroup and the injustices that ordinarily occur within the criminal justice system
is of importance due to the lack of research regarding such phenomenon. Bach (2009)
recommends future research to shed light onto the problems within the adversarial criminal
justice system that are often unnoticed. One suggested method for future studies relies on the
importance of average citizens sitting in and observing court, without getting distracted by the
orderliness in which the proceedings take place. Data collected from courtroom observations
need to focus on two distinct interest areas. Attention should be given to the amount of
discretion given to legal professionals, as well as the amount of time it takes for the assignment
of court-appointed defense (Bach, 2009).

Literature Review
One of the main issues behind the condition of lax adversarialism has roots in the
significant discretion given to prosecutors. As prosecutors are often claimed as the most
powerful officials in the criminal justice system, their routine decisions have a significant impact
and often impose the most severe consequences on case outcomes. Often times such discretion
is conflicted by a prosecutor’s goal to pursue justice, which results in the misuse of prosecutorial
discretion to either obtain a conviction or dismiss cases where conviction is not deemed likely
(Davis, 2008). Prosecutors are also significantly bound by maintaining a cooperative working
atmosphere. Research conducted by Gertz (1980) shows how the relationship between the
prosecutor and public defender affects the outcome of a case. Extreme sentences were found to
likely to be the result of a poor relationship between the two courtroom workgroup members.
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Furthermore, a cooperative court relationship between the prosecutor and public defender was
also related to a greater likelihood that charges would be dropped and a lighter sentence imposed
(Gertz, 1980).
Haynes, Ruback and Cusick (2010) examined the effect of similarity, proximity, and
stability of courtroom workgroups on sentencing decisions. They found that workgroup
similarities in race, gender, political party, age, college, and law school significantly affected the
rates of incarceration. The courtroom workgroups with the highest level of gender similarity had
odds of incarceration that were 33% lower than the odds of incarceration found in workgroups
with the lowest level of gender similarity. They identified that greater proximity within the
workgroup was associated with lower rates of incarceration and a greater likelihood of fines,
which suggests that a trade-off between incarceration and economic sanctions is most likely to
occur if the judge and defense counsel are located close to one another. The use of fines at
sentencing was also significantly affected by proximity, stability, and similarity. The most stable
workgroups were less likely to impose fines, whereas similarity in college education was
associated with higher rates of fine imposition (Haynes et al., 2010).
Hartley, Miller, and Spohn (2010) found that the type of attorney was not a significant
predictor of whether the decisions to release the defendant or to reduce charges. Champion
(1989), however, yielded significantly different results. Champion (1989) found discrepancies
between the outcomes with private attorneys versus public defenders. Only 11.3% of the studied
cases defended by public defenders were dropped, while 48% of the cases defended by private
attorneys were dropped. 87.7% of public defender cases were convicted as a result of pleabargaining, in comparison to 36% of private attorney cases (Champion, 1989). Similar to the
results of the study conducted by Champion (1989) were the findings of a study by Williams
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(2013) evaluating the effectiveness of public defenders in comparison to private attorneys in four
counties located in Florida. The study found defendants that had been represented by public
defenders to be less likely than those represented by private attorneys to have their cases
dismissed, even after controlling for outside factors such as the number of charges against the
defendant and the seriousness of the offense in question. Furthermore, defendants represented
by public defenders were less likely to be released on bail. Williams (2013) also found that in
comparison to those with privately retained attorneys, indigent defendants represented by court
appointed public defenders were convicted more often. The discrepancies in the literature, along
with Bach’s (2009) recommendations, helped to build the foundation for my study.

Methods
Given the complexity of power and relationships within the courtroom workgroup, the
central question guiding the present study is: How do the members’ interactions affect the
adversarial nature of the criminal justice system and the prevalence of injustice? A
phenomenological study devoted to identifying patterns among the courtroom workgroup is best
suited to examine this issue because there is a lack of research dedicated to the exploration of
ordinary injustices. I will examine the issue using a qualitative approach, in which data will be
collected in natural settings and inductive data analysis will be used to establish both patterns
and themes.
The phenomenon that has guided my research is the injustices that occur within the
criminal justice system. I examined and evaluated the circumstances in which these injustices
occur. Using the phenomenological approach the goal of my research was to unveil everyday
patterns within the criminal justice system. Phenomenological studies aim to illuminate, or give
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meaning, to a particular phenomenon. As phenomenological studies often incorporate multiple
data sources, I decided to gather information through both observations and an additional source.
Making use of more than one data source, also known as triangulation, will further address the
validity of my study. My observations are to be conducted over a three-month time span at the
Wood County Common Pleas Court.

Data Collection
To collect data, I will be studying the overall dynamics of the courtroom workgroup, both
in the individual tasks and the shared goals of the main players. This includes observing the
interactions among the workgroup members, and also identifying patterns and themes that result
from such interactions. I will be focusing on the interactions between members of the courtroom
workgroup and the patterns of injustice that result, while simultaneously taking field notes. As I
am interning in the prosecutor’s office at the Wood County Common Pleas Court during the time
in which my observations will be conducted, I will be able to do so during my hour long lunch
breaks on the three days of each week in which criminal proceedings are held: Mondays,
Tuesdays, and Fridays. I will furthermore use Wednesdays and Thursdays to review and type up
my field notes, while simultaneously looking for patterns within my observations. In addition to
the observations I conduct, I will gather information from the Clerk of Courts about the number
of cases that were taken to trial at the Wood County Common Pleas Court in the previous year.

Data Analysis Strategy
The data will be analyzed using the three phenomenological data analysis steps of
bracketing, horizontalization, and developing clusters of meanings. Bracketing is the first step in
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data analysis. I will set aside my prior experiences in order to best understand the experiences of
the participants being studied. While analyzing data using the bracketing method, I will be
removing any information in my field notes that I may have obtained through my job duties as an
intern, rather than strictly through my observations. The second step, horizontalization, will be
used to give equal value to every significant occurrence of injustices in the courtroom. By doing
so, I will give equal weight to all of the information I obtained through my observations, which
will ultimately set my data up for the third data analysis step, developing clusters of meanings.
In order to develop clusters of meanings, I will group my findings into themes or meaning units.
The findings of the study will be used to describe the universal essence of the injustices that
occur within the criminal justice system (Creswell, 2007).

Results
Several key themes emerged after observing the courtroom workgroup, and analyzing the
data using the three data analysis steps. The findings of my study fit into four distinct categories:
prosecutorial discretion, the relationship between the prosecutor and defense counsel, private
attorneys versus public defenders, and judicial discretion. I have further included a category for
findings that do not fit into any of the above-mentioned categories.

Prosecutorial discretion
While observing court proceedings, I witnessed prosecutorial discretion come into play
on three occasions, two of which revolved around setting bond. First, the assistant prosecutor
recommended to the judge that a particular defendant be released on his own recognizance in
addition to electronic home monitoring, in concurrence with the recommendation made by the
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public defender. Within a matter of minutes, however, the prosecuting attorney revoked his
compliance with the public defender and instead suggested a $50,000 bond along with an
electronic home monitoring system. I also observed prosecutorial discretion as two defendants
appeared in court for probation violation hearings due to failing a drug screening. While the
public defender suggested each defendant be released on her own recognizance, the assistant
prosecutor assigned to the first case recommended a $25,000 bond, and the assistant prosecutor
assigned to the second case suggested a lesser bond of $20,000.
The third act of discretion by the prosecuting attorney involved case dismissal. While
waiting for court to begin one morning, I overheard a conversation between two police officers
and the assistant prosecuting attorney. The three individuals were discussing a drug case in
which the assistant prosecutor had decided against presenting the case to the grand jury.

Relationship between prosecutor and defense counsel
In observing the interactions between the prosecuting attorneys and public defenders,
the relationship between the two was often one of a cooperative workgroup. All but one of the
public defenders observed seemed to have not only a working relationship with the prosecuting
attorney, but also a working relationship with the rest of the staff working in the prosecutor’s
office. Although the majority of the interactions that took place between the prosecuting
attorney and the public defender were that of a cooperative workgroup, I did observe a bond
hearing in which the relationship was uncooperative.
I observed two different cases that were taken to trial. The defendant in the first trial
observed was being represented by a public defender, while the defendant in the second trial had
retained private counsel. The relationship between the assistant prosecutor and defense counsel
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was observed to have an effect on the court proceedings as a whole. I observed the trial in which
the defendant was represented by a public defender to carry on in a steady manner. The opposite
was observed during the second trial, however, with the defendant being represented by a private
attorney. Instead of the proceedings carrying out fluently, the overall course of the trial was
abrupt.

Private attorneys versus public defenders
When evaluating private counsel versus public defenders I focused my attention towards
three major factors: relationship with the defendant, knowledge of the case, and readiness.
Private counsel was observed to be superior to public defenders in all three regards. Private
attorneys entered the courtroom knowing exactly whom they were representing on every
occasion observed, and also appeared to have a relationship with their client’s family on four
different occasions. Contrary to such were public defenders, as they oftentimes entered the
courtroom reading off names from a list to identify the individuals they were representing. I
observed public defenders to introduce themselves to and meet with a defendant just minutes
before court was scheduled to begin. I observed one public defender to ask for three of his
clients to be recalled, as he was not up date on the case. When he did take the stand,
approximately one half hour later, he still appeared to be unprepared, as he was scrambling
through his notes and leaned over to view the assistant prosecutor’s notes on one of the cases.
One of the three defendants being represented by this public defender was unaware of the terms
of his plea agreement, as he was not informed of the stipulation regarding which bank he was
required to open a checking and savings account with.
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On one specific occasion there was only one public defender present and he filled in for
two other public defenders. The present public defender appeared to be overwhelmed as he was
attempting to make time to meet with each individual before his or her case was presented to the
judge.
I overheard a conversation between one public defender and the court constable regarding
the public defender’s strange behavior in the courtroom the previous day. The court constable
asked how he was feeling as he had zoned out for a lengthy period of time and did not stand
upon the judge’s entry to the courtroom until the constable tapped him on the shoulder to get his
attention. The public defender admitted to having a heavy caseload, which resulted in him not
getting much sleep in the last two weeks.

Judicial discretion
I observed judicial discretion to be most apparent in setting bond for the
defendant. On 11 different occasions the assistant prosecuting attorney suggested a cash bond be
put in place, while the defense attorney suggested the defendant be released on his own
recognizance. On 9 of these occasions a cash bond was set, while the defendant was released on
his own recognizance 3 times. On 7 occasions the defense counsel recommended a bond of a
lesser amount than what was recommended by the assistant prosecuting attorney. Of these 7
occurrences, the judge only sided with the defense twice. On one occasion, the defense attorney
recommended a bond amendment for his client to be released on his own recognizance; the
assistant prosecuting attorney assigned to the case was not in favor of such recommendation.
The judge did grant the release on his own recognizance bond amendment, but also put into
place the stipulation of electronic home monitoring.
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The judge also holds discretionary power regarding sentencing impositions. On one
occasion I observed both the assistant prosecutor, as well as the defense attorney, recommend a
defendant to be sentenced to community control. The judge, however, expressed this
recommendation to be too lenient and instead sentenced the individual to 9 months incarceration
on the first charge, 2 years of incarceration on the second, and another 9 months on the third
charge to be served concurrently. I observed a defense attorney suggest his client be permitted to
continue community control with the stipulation that said individual would actively look for
employment. In this case, the judge did not honor the recommendation and instead imposed 45
days for the defendant to serve in the justice center with the termination of community control.

Other Findings
One of the most significant issues I observed during my study was that court proceedings
rarely began at their scheduled time. On one occasion, court proceedings began 35 minutes
beyond the scheduled time. On two occasions court did not begin until 40 minutes past the time
scheduled. I further observed start times that were 15 minutes, 25 minutes, and even 1 hour and
10 minutes beyond the scheduled time. I also observed court on a day in which the microphones
in the courtroom were not working. While observing trial, I overheard snide remarks being
made about the privately retained defense attorney on the part of the prosecutor’s office staff
members. In 2013, only 9 of the years’ 668 were taken to a trial by jury (Clerk of Courts,
personal communication, April 17, 2013)
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Discussion and Conclusions
I found the prosecutor to be privileged with the power of discretion. In regards to the
prosecutor retracting his suggestion that a defendant be release on his own recognizance, the

prosecutor did so only after observing the reaction of the victim’s family in the courtroom. After
noticing that the family was visibly upset, including three individual family members in tears, the
prosecuting attorney exhibited his power of discretion by significantly increasing his bond
recommendation.
The prosecutor’s discretionary power came into play in the cases against two defendants
who stood before the judge as a result of failing a drug test, ultimately in violation with the terms
of each individual’s probation. Both defendants in such occurrence were female, appeared to be
in their mid to late twenties, and were being represented by the same public defender.
Additionally, neither defendant had previously violated the terms of their probation. The only
evident difference between the cases was that a different assistant prosecutor had been assigned
to each case, yet there was a difference in the amount of $5,000 between the prosecutor’s
suggestion for bond in the first case and the amount suggested by the other prosecutor in the
second case. It is possible that there were outside factors behind such recommendations, but it is
likely that prosecutorial discretion was exercised.
The findings showed that prosecutors have discretionary power over whether or not to
present a case to the grand jury, as I overheard the assistant prosecutor explain to law
enforcement officials that she decided not to present a particular case to the grand jury due to the
lack of substantial evidence. The assistant prosecutor stated that photographs associated with the
offense would most likely not have been sufficient enough for an indictment, and definitely not
sufficient enough for the defendant to be found guilty at trial. Prosecutors are given the power to
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decide which cases will be pursued, and do so with the ability to convict in mind. While
prosecutorial discretion can be argued to be beneficial by disposing of weak cases that may
burden defendants and the court, the courts were established to promote justice, rather than seek
conviction. The criminal justice system is undermined by prosecutorial discretion when the main
goal is to convict. Dismissing weak cases not only allows possibly guilty individuals to freely
engage in further criminal behavior, but also denies victims the opportunity for justice. By
exercising prosecutorial discretion, and weeding out the cases in which a conviction is likely,
prosecutors are setting the foundation under which lax adversarialism occurs.
The relationship between the prosecutor and defense counsel directly affected the
outcome of cases presented before the judge. A cooperative courtroom workgroup was observed
in all but one occurrence in which a public defender was present. I deemed the workgroup to be
of cooperative nature, as the public defenders knew the individuals by name, and also knew
personal information regarding the prosecuting attorneys and support staff. I overheard one
public defender asking the prosecuting attorney questions regarding his family, and at another
time I overhead the public defender talk to the prosecutor about dinner plans for the evening. I
observed one public defender to sit in the lobby of the prosecutor’s office before heading to the
courtroom for arraignments and he conversed with the receptionist about the previous day’s trial.
The individuals that were part of the cooperative workgroup were involved with court
proceedings that occurred swiftly and smoothly. This is especially true when comparing the jury
trial in which the defendant was represented by a public defender to the jury trial in which the
defendant retained private counsel. The public defender appeared knowledgeable as to how
trials were conducted in the particular courtroom, as well as confident in the state having
provided all potential evidence to the defense in a timely fashion through the discovery process.
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The opposite occurred under the circumstance of an uncooperative, unfamiliar workgroup, in
which a private attorney was representing the defendant.
I deemed such to be an uncooperative workgroup as I overheard several members of the
prosecutor’s office staff make snide remarks regarding the private attorney’s appearance and
demeanor. Within the first hour of proceedings, the private attorney asked to approach the bench
on three different occasions. He further claimed that the state did not provide the potential
evidence with ample time for him to examine it, thus attempting to object the admission of
multiple pieces of evidence. In addition, he attempted to object to two of the state’s witnesses
being considered expert witnesses. As the judge continuously overruled his objections, the
private attorney was outwardly frustrated and began mumbling under his breath. The findings
ultimately showed that a cooperative courtroom workgroup makes for a steady advancing of
court proceedings, and a cooperative workgroup more often occurs when a public defender is
representing a defendant, as the public defenders interact with the other members of the
courtroom on a regular basis. Courtroom proceedings occurring at a steady pace was not found
to be advantageous to the defendant.
Although public defenders were often members of the ideal cooperative workgroup,
clients being represented by such court appointed public defenders appeared to be under more
stress in the courtroom than those being represented by privately retained counsel. Not only
were public defenders unaware of who they would be representing until they were introduced to
their clients in the courtroom, they also were not always able to meet with their clients before
being called before the judge. After one defendant was called to present, she exclaimed, “But I
haven’t even talked to him yet.” It was evident that she was upset by this, and stood before the
judge unaware of what would be happening. As the public defender was not able to meet with
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all clients beforehand, this placed indigent defendants at a disadvantage, as they were unable to
talk to their attorney about their case from their own point of view. Without such meetings,
indigent defendants were blindsided by the recommendations made by the public defender on
their behalf, and on one occasion, unaware of the terms of their plea agreement.
It is most likely that on overwhelming caseload was to blame for the lack of time to meet
with the defendants, in addition to public defenders standing in place of other public defenders
from the same office. When the latter was observed, one defendant expressed anguish over
being uninformed regarding the absence of his attorney. In comparison with the clients of
private attorneys, who were observed to have a relationship with the individual representing
them, indigent defendants experience unnecessary additional stress on their day in court. The
additional stress experienced by indigent defendants is likely the result of inadequate
representation. The current public criminal defense system is characterized by the lack of
funding and resources needed to provide adequate representation for their clients. Under the
current system, indigent defendants are placed at a disadvantage and are denied an equal
opportunity for justice under the adversarial criminal justice system.
The findings highlighted the existence of judicial discretion. Although both the
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel offer recommendations for bond, it is ultimately the
decision of the judge to set bond. It was observed that on many occasions either the prosecuting
attorney or defense attorney would recommend a reasonable cash bond be set in place, yet no
amounts were offered by the recommending individual. In such case, it is solely up to the
discretion of the judge to decide what constitutes a reasonable amount.
Court proceedings beginning significantly late on six different occasions and slightly late
on many other dates observed directly affect the defendants and any individuals that have
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accompanied them to the courtroom. While they are required to be in the courtroom at a
scheduled time, it is common for the defendants to not stand before the judge until much after
such time, which results in disrupting their plans outside of the courtroom. One defendant was
brought to court by his father and was scheduled for a probation violation to appear before the
judge at 1:00pm, yet it was 1:50pm and court had not even began for that afternoon. The father
expressed distress to the court constable as he was his son’s only ride home from court, but had
another obligation to pick up his wife from work at 3:00pm. I heard a defendant express concern
that she would not be out of court in time to pick her daughter up from school due to the court
proceedings running later than scheduled.
Although 668 cases were presented before the judge at the Wood County Common Pleas
Court in the year 2013, only 9 cases were taken to trial. That means that a little over 1% of the
years defendants exercised their right to a jury trial. It is likely that this number is so low due to
the prevalence of plea-bargaining that occurs in today’s criminal justice system. Plea-bargaining
occurs when the prosecutor and defense work out an agreement foregoing a criminal trial. Pleabargaining is coercive by nature. Not only does it speed up the criminal process, but it often
entails the defendant pleading guilty to a lesser charge with a more lenient sentence than if they
were convicted at trial of a more serious charge. The time it takes to pursue a criminal trial may
conflict with a defendant’s work and family responsibilities. Taking a case to trial is also risky
as the defendant is subject to the maximum sentence upon conviction. Resulting from
convenience and fear, defendants may feel a plea agreement to be their best option, even if they
did not the commit the crime in question.
Plea-bargaining is also a controversial practice for all defense attorneys, especially public
defenders. Public defenders are conflicted with the dual goals of representing their client to the

HONORS PROJECT

18

best of their ability and maintaining a cooperative relationship with the prosecutor. When public
defenders pressure their clients to accept plea bargains, they are allowing professional alliances
to trump adversarialism. While plea-bargaining may be beneficial in some cases, the prevalence
of such practice is one way in which ordinary injustices occur in the criminal justice system.
I found that the courtroom workgroup dynamics set the foundation for the condition of
lax adversarialism, under which ordinary injustice prevails. Misuse of prosecutorial discretion
allows for cases and defendants to slip through the cracks unchecked. Public defenders face
excessive caseloads without appropriate funding and resources, which places their clients at a
disadvantage as they struggle to provide adequate representation to each of their clients. Public
defenders also feel pressure to maintain a cooperative workgroup relationship, ultimately
compromising justice for indigent defendants. Judicial discretion and the difference between
public and private attorneys are likely to contribute to the prevalence of lax adversarialism, and
further research should be conducted to evaluate such.

Strengths and Limitations
By conducting a phenomenological study, I was able to conduct my observations under
less structured conditions, which allowed me to record data without pre-determined expectations.
The lack of pre-determined expectations was beneficial in observing all aspects of the everyday
courtroom occurrences. Phenomenology also suggests the use of multiple data sources to
address validity. As a means of doing so I not only conducted court observations, but also
obtained information from the Clerk of Courts. The data analysis steps of bracketing,
horizontalization, and developing clusters of meaning were beneficial to making sense of the
collected data and developing themes among such observations.
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The main limitation of this study was the three-month time constraint, as a longer period
of time is necessary in order to grasp a deeper understanding of the interactions among members
of the courtroom workgroup and their implications on the outcome of criminal cases. Resulting
from such limited time, I was not able to conduct any interviews as a data collection method. A
third method of data collection would have added to not only the validity of my study, but also to
its’ quality. As I had initially hoped to evaluate how the proximity, stability, and similarity of
the courtroom workgroup affected the outcome of court cases, I was unable to do so without
conducting interviews of the courtroom workgroup members regarding personal information,
including, but not limited to, one’s age, academic background, and work experience. I was
furthermore unable to interview defendants regarding their experience in the criminal justice
system. Doing so may have led to a better understanding of the quality of private counsel versus
public defenders.
Furthermore, as an intern in the prosecutor’s office, it was difficult to balance my time
between working and observing court, which ultimately led to me giving up my lunch break to
conduct my courtroom observations. Thus, my observations could only be conducted for
approximately one hour each time. My being an intern in the prosecutor’s office led to another
limitation of this study, as I had knowledge of the cases being presented to the court that the
general public would not ordinarily have. For many of the cases I observed, I had worked on
either the pre-discovery or the discovery, and it was difficult at times to serve as an outside
observer, as I had already known inside information regarding the case.
Future Research
As there is little previous research regarding the ordinary injustices that occur on a daily
basis in the courtroom, it is imperative that future research be dedicated towards uncovering the
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reasons as to why such injustices occur. It would be beneficial to study the indigent criminal
defense system in particular, with a specific focus on inadequate funding and excessive caseloads
that may lead to public defenders cutting corners and ultimately undermining justice for their
clients. Courtroom observations should also be conducted across a longer period of time than
available during this study. By observing court for a longer period of time, more in-depth
findings could shed light on the ways in which members of the courtroom workgroup set the
foundation for injustice to prevail.
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